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Abstract 
 
In an effort to create new sociotechnical tools to 
combat online harassment, we developed a scale to 
detect and measure verbal violence within individual 
tweets. Unfortunately, we found that the scale, based on 
scales effective at detecting harassment offline, was 
unreliable for tweets. Here, we begin with information 
about the development and validation of our scale, then 
discuss the scale’s shortcomings for detecting 
harassment in tweets, and explore what we can learn 
from this scale’s failures. We explore how rarity, 
context, and individual coder’s differences create 
challenges for detecting verbal violence in individual 
tweets. We also examine differences in on- and offline 
harassment that limit the utility of existing harassment 
measures for online contexts. We close with a 
discussion of potential avenues for future work in 
automated harassment detection. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Online harassment is a continuing problem, 
endemic to many social media platforms and forms of 
online computer-mediated communications. A 
remarkable 40% of all adults and 32% of teenagers 
connected to the internet have experienced at least one 
type of online harassment [18,27]. For some people, the 
experience of online harassment is ongoing, lasting for 
weeks on end [30]. Though individuals who witness 
online harassment may be apathetic toward it, those on 
the receiving end are often extremely perturbed by the 
experience [18].  
Online harassment can have severely deleterious 
effects on individuals. Among youths, cyberbullying is 
associated with school violence, suicidal ideation, 
offline victimization, substance abuse, as well as other 
negative effects [28]. Studies of the effects of online 
harassment on adult victims are not as numerous as 
those focusing on teens and adolescents, but 
mainstream media outlets frequently relay the stories of 
adult victims. As of late, in part due to an online 
movement often characterized as a concerted effort to 
harass women [see 28] media and academic attention to 
online harassment have increased. A number of 
recently publicized cases of harassment have been so 
extreme that women have fled their homes for fear of 
their safety [23,31,34]. In one particularly distressing 
case, sustained online harassment may have been a 
factor in a young woman’s suicide [13]. 
Within this paper, we report on the rationale for 
and the process of developing a scale for measuring 
verbal violence in individual tweets so that we may 
eventually automatically detect malicious content. We 
detail the problems we encountered that stemmed from 
faulty assumptions and methodological problems, we 
explain why it was difficult to reach appropriate levels 
of agreement on what constituted verbal violence, and 
we consider the utility of using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) for scale validation purposes. We share 
this experience with the hope that our mistakes may 
help to steer others in the right direction. We close with 
a discussion of avenues for future work in verbal 
violence detection and measurement. 
 
2.  Background  
 
Gender-based online harassment is not a new 
occurrence and has been observed and recorded since 
the early days of online computer-mediated 
communications [25].  Popular platforms such as 
Twitter that permit users to easily obfuscate their real 
identities may beget such harassment [5,46]. That 
harassing and abusive messages sent over the internet 
can reach so many people in such a short time makes 
managing such harassment an onerous task [11]. 
Manual reporting and commercial content moderation 
(CCM) [see 34] are currently the most common 
approaches to combatting harassment [14]. In this 
model, it is either incumbent upon the victim or a third-
party observer of harassment to report and/or manage 
the harassing content. Automated detection efforts have 
so far had limited success [see, e.g., ,15,35,41,45], but 
machine learning approaches hold promise [35,39,40]. 
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Under the existing manual moderation model, the 
burden too-often falls on underpaid CCM workers [36] 
to act as gatekeepers, screening content (and seeing 
everything) so that the end-user does not have to [37]. 
Harassment continues despite these in-place reporting 
measures [30], which can exact a heavy toll on the 
CCM workers tasked with evaluating content. These 
workers are subjected to the worst that humanity has to 
offer within online environments. They report a 
multitude of emotional disturbances including 
developing existential dread, intrusive imagery, and 
desensitization to [12,36,37]. Mental health services are 
often not provided to these workers [12]. We hoped to 
devise more effective means of content moderation that 
insulates both the would-be victims as well as the 
content moderators from the effects of verbal violence.  
By leveraging data generated by Twitter users to 
increase our understanding of and ability to detect 
toxicity and verbal violence as they occur on Twitter, 
we hoped to develop sociotechnical tools for 
combatting online harassment. Our initial approach 
involved hand-coding content with the end-goal of 
using human-labeled data to train machine-learning 
classifiers to automate the detection and management 
of malicious Tweets. Although, for a number of 
reasons, our attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, we 
gained a deeper understanding of just how complex 
online harassment is as well as how difficult it is to 
detect and manage.  
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1. Developing a scale 
 
We identified individual tweets as an ideal place at 
which to detect verbal violence. Individual tweets 
constitute a discrete unit of analysis and the ability to 
manage content at this level would be both useful and 
computationally inexpensive. Despite the existence of 
several decades’ worth of extant literature on online 
harassment, we were unable to find any metrics of 
harassment or cyber-aggression that could be readily 
applied to individual tweets. As such, we endeavored to 
create our scale. 
There are existing approaches for detecting 
harassment in online communities (such as Slashdot, 
MySpace [45], and “social news” sites [41]), and for 
user models on Twitter [16]. Our approach of coding 
tweets for content, then using MTurk to code more 
broadly, is in line with these other harassment detection 
efforts. Literature shows that profanity is often used in 
bullying attempts [12,41,45]. The automatic detection 
and blocking of profanity would be relatively easy to 
accomplish. However, that approach would yield many 
false positives. Hence, we sought a solution that would 
be sensitive to the context in which such keywords 
occur. To accomplish this more complex task, we 
decided to begin with human coders instead of 
automated methods. Our plan was to use human coders, 
able to capture these subtleties, in order to generate 
training data for automated classifiers that could aid 
moderators and users in the detection of violent content. 
Our scale was designed to detect harassment [see ,35 
for a report on binary [present/absent] harassment 
detection] and to indicate the specific type of 
harassment occurring.  
 Although there are studies that focus on 
harassment occurring [30] and being discussed [4] on 
Twitter, none offered insights into how we might 
achieve context-aware harassment detection. As such, 
we turned to psychological literature regarding online 
harassment cyberbullying, aggression (both online and 
in-person), and the measurement thereof. 
A large body of scholarly work focuses on the 
differences in individual traits and situational factors 
that predispose individuals to perpetrate aggressions 
[see 6,31]. The same trait differences that correlate with 
aggression also relate to the perpetration of online 
harassment [33]. In addition to the shared personality 
correlates of offline-aggression and online harassment, 
the dynamics of cyberbullying bear a close resemblance 
to those of face-to-face bullying. In both cases, the 
perpetrator intends to harm its victim [20]. Thus, online 
harassment constitutes a human aggression [1].  
Because online harassment is a manifestation of 
aggression, we felt justified in modeling our scale on 
existing measures of face-to-face aggression. We chose 
to model our scale items primarily on the Buss-Perry 
Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ) due to its high 
reliability and internal consistency [10] and because it 
has been used to check the criterion validity of existing 
measures of cyber-aggression [11]. Several additional 
items pertaining to doxing, rumoring, and the sending 
of threatening reactions were adapted from the Cyber 
Victim Bullying Scale (CVBS) [11] and the Facebook 
Aggression Measure [33]. We objectified the language 
used in the original scale items for use on tweets. For 
example, we changed the BPAQ item “I can’t help 
getting into arguments when people disagree with me” 
to read as “User shares personal opinions about people, 
groups, or institutions that the user disagrees with.” 
This allowed for human coders to read a given tweet 
and respond to each of the scale items on a Likert-style 
scale where lower numbers indicate that the item is 
uncharacteristic of the tweet and higher numbers 
indicate that the item is characteristic of the tweet. We 
omitted from our scale items from the BPAQ that could 
not be objectified in a way that would allow for coding 
by a third party. These included most of the items 
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related to physical aggression (e.g. “Once in a while, I 
can’t control the urge to strike another person”), as well 
as some items related to hostility (e.g. “I wonder why 
sometimes I feel so bitter about things”) [10]. We also 
created an item related to ad hominin attacks based on 
the number of such tweets we saw when reading 
through our dataset. Our item pool initially consisted of 
18 items and was eventually reduced to 14 items in the 
final revision of the scale (see Table 1 for the final scale 
items and their levels of agreement between coders). 
It should be noted here that the BPAQ measures 
trait aggression. In this approach, we had hoped that the 
types of aggression observed in tweets would correlate 
with the behaviors captured by the BPAQ. As we will 
explain in this paper’s discussion, this approach was 
unsuccessful. 
 
3.2. Collecting data 
 
Using TwitterGoggles [29], we collected millions 
of tweets containing several hashtags, including but not 
limited to #GamerGate and #NotYourShield. Because 
of the media coverage of harassment coming from both 
sides of the #GamerGate controversy, we believed that 
#GamerGate tweets would provide an ideal population 
of tweets for the development and testing of new means 
to study and detect toxicity on Twitter. 
 
3.3. Training human coders  
 
We turned to MTurk to expedite the coding of our 
dataset.  Prior to hiring Turkers to participate in our 
study, we received approval to do so from the Illinois 
Institute of Technology’s institutional review board. 
 To gain eligibility for our tweet-coding tasks, 
Turkers were required to complete an online training 
program using Qualtrics and disseminated via MTurk. 
The program consisted of three components. First, 
Turkers were shown a mockup of the coding form for a 
tweet already rated by the authors. Detailed 
explanations of the authors’ rationale for each rating 
were provided. When ready, Turkers proceeded to the 
next page where they were given a blank coding form 
and asked to rate the tweet from the previous page. 
Turkers were not permitted to go back to the previous 
section to check the authors’ ratings. Those who agreed 
with the authors’ ratings on at least 12 out of the 14 
scale items were permitted to move on to the final 
component. The Turkers who performed satisfactorily 
were then given a new tweet and another blank coding 
form. This tweet had already been coded by the authors, 
but Turkers were not permitted to know the authors’ 
ratings. Those whose ratings were in agreement with 
our own on at least 12 out of the 14 items “passed” the 
training program and were granted an MTurk 
qualification that allowed them to work on subsequent 
tweet-coding tasks. Instituting this program increased 
between-coder reliability (see [22]). All participating 
Turkers were compensated $2.50 through MTurk for 
attempting the training program, which took an average 
of ~14 minutes to complete. 
 
3.4. Human coding 
 
Once we reached reasonable reliability between 
coders on our modified scale, we proceeded to have 
human coders, recruited and trained through MTurk, 
rate 900 tweets (see [14]) from our #GamerGate 
dataset. Each tweet was coded only once. A total of six 
human coders participated in the coding process (see 
Table 2 for information about the coders). The coders 
made a total of 10,771 “Uncharacteristic” ratings, 1,535 
“Characteristic” ratings, and 294 “I’m not sure” ratings. 
Turkers were paid $0.75 per tweet, each of which took 
~1 minute to code. We also provided coders a large text 
box in which to enter comments on their ratings, and we 
provide many examples of those comments here. 
Each coded tweet was given a composite 
aggression score, accounting for each scale item that 
was coded as being “characteristic” of the tweet. 
Possible scores ranged from 0-14, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of aggression present in a tweet. 
Aggression scores for the coded tweets ranged from 0-
9 (M = 1.7, SD = 2.24). Using these 900 coded tweets 
as training data, we hope to build machine-learning 
classifiers for the scale items. 
 
4. Explaining disagreements among 
coders  
 
The third column of Table 1 shows the degree to 
which coders agreed with one another on a practice 
round of coding tasks consisting of 20 tweets. Each of 
the 20 tweets was coded by two independent coders. As 
you can see, between-coder agreement varied greatly 
by item. However, the average agreement score across 
all 14 items reached 70%, which we felt was suitable 
for a first pass at coding the dataset. We identified four 
primary mechanisms for explaining the disagreement 
between coders we witnessed: rare events, insufficient 
context, questions of audience, and individuals’ 
perceptions. 
 
4.1. Rare events 
 
The two items with the highest level of between-
coder agreement are items 1 and 2 (see Table 1). This 
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does not reflect the ease with which coders were able to 
apply this item to tweets, but rather the fact that almost 
no tweets in our dataset appear to be characteristic of 
these two scale items. In our batch of 900 coded tweets, 
only two tweets were coded as being characteristic of 
either of these two items. To our surprise, both tweets 
were coded as being characteristic of both items 1 and 
2. Though both items are similar in that they relate to 
threats of physical violence, one requires the threat to 
not be made as a means to protect one’s rights, while 
the other requires that the threat is not made for the 
aforementioned reason.  
Together, the practice-coding agreement levels and 
the coding of these two items in the batch of 900 tell us 
several things. First, the proportion of #GamerGate 
tweets containing threats of physical violence appears 
to be quite low. Second, it tells us that humans are 
reliably able to agree on the absence of violent threats 
in tweets but not the presence of violent threats. Given 
the rarity of some kinds of harassment (e.g., threats of 
physical violence), the agreement levels may 
overestimate actual agreement because chance 
agreement is so likely for uncharacteristic tweets. Even 
when coders do detect violent threats and code tweets 
accordingly, they are unable to discriminate between 
the motives for the physical threats. This lack of 
discrimination may be a function of the 140-character 
limit imposed on tweets. 
Similar to items 1 and 2, item 9 which related to 
the public disclosure of private information (i.e., 
doxing) was rare within our coded sample (N = 2). 
However, we suspect based on comments provided to 
us by our coders that the actual rate of occurrence may 
be slightly higher. One of our coders wrote, 
 
It looks like this user may have shared 
personally identifiable information and 
embarrassing images of someone else, but that 
info wasn't included in this particular 
conversation so I didn't rate those sections as 
characteristic.  
 
Thus, it is important to note that the absence of 
information, such as pictures, that was originally 
included in a tweet but is now missing, may have 
caused the misclassification of tweets on some items. 
 
4.2. Insufficient context 
 
Other sources of disagreement are likely related to 
the lack of specific context human coders have access 
to when reading a 140-character string of text which 
may or may not include links to other text or images, or 
to information about the author. We provided coders 
with both the text from a tweet and the URL to view the 
tweet online. We asked that coders follow the provided 
links whenever possible to gain additional context (i.e., 
to see if a tweet is part of a thread to determine if it’s 
argumentative), but we have no way to know if or how 
often coders actually followed the links. We do know 
that some coders followed the links, as we received a 
number of comments from coders relating to dead-links 
making tweets hard to code. Coders specifically 
referred to difficulties relating to lack of context 42 
times, and to dead links/missing content 107 times.  
Another potential source of context (broadly) for 
the tweets in our sample is knowledge about 
#GamerGate. We did not ask our coders to rate their 
level of familiarity with #GamerGate, as we were 
concerned that seeing references to #GamerGate before 
coding would prime individuals with strong opinions to 
code differently. However, our attempt to avoid 
priming effects may have introduced more variance into 
our rating dataset. For instance, ratings for the scale 
items for which between-coder agreement was less than 
70% may have been influenced by the coders’ 
knowledge of #GamerGate. This conclusion is 
supported by a number of comments provided by Coder 
2, for example: 
 
Rated 13 & 14 as characteristic because both of 
this user's tweets in the conversation seem to 
indicate that the user thinks GamerGate is 
being misrepresented as a group that dislikes 
games. 
 
If it's not clear, I rated #14 characteristic 
because the user is defending their (and other 
pro-Gamergate individuals’) stance as being 
for ethical journalism instead of against women 
in gaming. 
 
Clearly, her ratings are influenced by her 
understanding of the differences between the two main 
sides involved in the #GamerGate controversy. The 
effects of the lack of prior understanding of the topic 
can best be shown by explaining the coding of a tweet 
that requires prior knowledge. Take the following tweet 
text, for instance: 
 
New to #GamerGate? We love inclusivity & 
diversity. Notice how our opponents are all left 
wing authoritarians, telling you what to think? 
[32] 
 
If you are familiar with #GamerGate, you realize 
that the statement about the nature of gamergaters (love 
inclusivity and diversity) is likely in response to 
comments by the media and by other Twitter users 
suggesting otherwise. If so, this tweet may be 
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characteristic of items 11-14, depending on how one 
interprets the items. It may also be considered 
characteristic of item 5, if one considers the act of 
providing contrary information to be equivalent to 
engaging in an argument. Or, the tweet is a sarcastic 
response mocking gamergaters and could be coded 
characteristic of items #5 and #11. Without an 
understanding of the issues surrounding #GamerGate, 
however, it is unlikely that a coder would rate any of 
these items as being characteristic of this particular 
tweet. 
 
4.3. Promotion and audience 
 
Sarcasm is just one challenge to interpreting the 
text of a tweet. Coders commented on a number of 
Twitter conventions that figured into their decisions 
about what codes to assign. For instance, they disagreed 
whether posting a link necessarily implies support for 
the content at the link. Coders commented: 
 
Linked article suggests unfair treatment of 
twitter poster's group. Linking of article is tacit 
defense of tweeter's group and image.  
 
and 
 
The tweet itself may not be inflammatory or 
contain any opinions, but the link itself does. 
Since this person is trying to spread the link, 
then regardless of whether they actually wrote 
up the content in that link I think this tweet 
counts as inflammatory and retaliatory content. 
 
While another said,  
 
The links themselves are definitely pro-GG and 
share some opinions of the opposing side, but 
because this user seems to just be posting these 
links to be “informative” and doesn't directly 
share any opinions of his own I didn't rate this 
tweet as being inflammatory in any way. 
 
It was difficult for coders to decide whether 
sarcastic or informative tweets constituted attempts to 
start an argument. The conventions around link sharing 
in Twitter are developing, and these comments 
highlight the challenge in detecting whether posting a 
link is supportive. Some of that detection boils down to 
context as mentioned earlier, but we saw other Twitter-
related disagreements that indicate something unique 
about Twitter (and it’s #GamerGate discussions 
specifically) are at play here: publicness. 
As one coder points out, tweets are public even 
when they contain @mentions or @replies: 
 
Just wanted to make a point about the "starting 
an argument" question. In this instance the 
tweeter is responding directly to someone he 
sides with. However, I'm taking the tweet to be 
"public" and therefore readable by, and 
somewhat directed at, people not necessarily in 
agreement with his comments…I'm assuming 
that because tweets are public, they are de facto 
made to the broader population, especially 
when they include a hashtag, and not just the 
individual person they might be addressed to or 
responding to. 
 
The public nature of tweets complicates the 
question of audience, and for topics such as harassment, 
the audience is of particular importance. Twitter 
accounts and users can conflate individuals and groups 
when assigning authorship to tweets, further 
complicating the notion of audience. For instance, 
accounts for companies, celebrities, and politicians are 
at once individual and institutional. What it means for 
an institution to be the target of harassment was an issue 
our coders faced: 
 
If it was directed at an individual it wouldn't be 
characteristic. But since it's directed at a 
company, whose reputation is partly tied to 
their business, I chose not sure. 
 
Whether or not a post or link constitutes promotion 
and how to judge whether a target or author is a group 
or individuals are problems unique to the online context 
of harassment. 
 
4.4. The eyes of the beholders 
 
Another source of between-coder differences in 
ratings may result from individual differences. A one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows that there is 
a small but significant difference between the overall 
aggression scores of tweets coded by women versus 
those coded by men. Women find, on average, tweets 
to be more aggressive (F(1,898) = 10.286, p = .001). 
This difference is compatible with findings that women 
are better able than men to detect more subtle forms of 
aggression (i.e., microaggressions), possibly because 
women are, unfortunately, more likely to have 
personally experienced certain types of 
microaggressions [2]. Women are also more likely to 
accurately (based on legal definitions) perceive a wider 
range of potentially ambiguous behaviors as 
harassment [38]. 
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However, this observed difference in our data is not 
necessarily a function of gender. It may be the case that 
women were simply given more aggressive (according 
to our scale) tweets to code than men were. It is difficult 
to make definitive conclusions given the small number 
of coders we employed and the number of tweets they 
coded.  
Other cognitive factors related to individual 
differences in the perception of aggression are likely at 
play as well. Perceptions of external stimuli appear to 
be influenced by individuals’ attributions of intent. 
Hostile attributional bias refers to a tendency for some 
individuals to interpret ambiguous stimuli as being 
intentionally aggressive and is found in both children 
and adults [17,19]. Additionally, people with angry or 
anxious dispositions are more likely to interpret 
ambiguous prose as being negative [43]. It is possible 
that our coders fell within one of these populations. 
However, given the rarity of such events, it seems more 
reasonable to infer that coders may underestimate the 
harassment that occurs rather than overestimate it. 
We initially thought it possible that different users 
found various tweets “funny” rather than “malicious” 
or “violent,” but existing research suggests that people 
generally agree when sexual humor is offensive [24]. 
We do not know, however, how people decide whether 
other types of humor are offensive rather than funny. In 
the #GamerGate dataset, posts about where a person 
lives, how many friends a person has, and whether a 
person does drugs or engages in other illegal activities 
are also mentioned (in addition to sexual content). Our 
coders were not sure what to do with these kinds of 
tweets, as evidenced by this comment: 
 
The tweet is an allusion to speculation that […] 
a gaming journalist […] was using cocaine at a 
press conference (I believe E3). I consider this 
in the grey area of posting a potentially 
reputation-damaging rumor, because while that 
rumor could certainly be reputation-damaging, 
the post seems to be mostly made in jest. 
 
This comment also indicates that tweets made in 
jest are not real in their consequences–the potential to 
damage one’s reputation is mitigated by the jest here. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
We found that individual tweets were not reliably 
categorized by multiple coders, at least not using 
existing measures of harassment. While the “rare 
events” problem could potentially be solved with more 
                                                
1 https://support.twitter.com/articles/117063 
data, the lack of context and the variation in individual 
perceptions of malicious content pose potentially 
insurmountable challenges for this “individual tweets” 
approach to manual harassment coding. Without 
reliable labeled data, it will be difficult to construct 
supervised learning classifiers using this approach.  
Given the rarity of harassment relative to all kinds 
of posts on Twitter, 900 tweets were likely not enough 
data to train an automated classifier effectively. 
However, 900 tweets were enough to reveal some 
patterns in disagreement between coders, as we have 
described above. Coding more tweets could potentially 
increase our ability to detect harassment, but it is not 
clear, given all the kinds of disagreement we 
documented, that the marginal benefits of doing so are 
worth the costs (in either computation or Turker time). 
 
5.1 Labelling users versus labelling content 
 
Existing tools take the “individual user” approach 
to content control. For instance, Twitter currently 
provides a blocking1 feature that allows a user to 
prevent others from following them and a muting2 
feature that prevents another users’ content from 
appearing. Both of those features operate at the user 
level. Rather, we were trying to label content, so that 
new tools would allow users to avoid certain types of 
posts instead of avoiding certain users altogether. This 
content approach would be useful in a number of 
scenarios including  
• doxing – if I mute an account who doxes me, I 
won’t know it happened 
• disagreement – I may be willing to engage in 
arguments as long as I’m not being physically 
threatened. 
The “individual tweets” approach to detecting 
verbal violence assumes that an individual utterance 
can be violent (or at least exhibit violent characteristics) 
without labeling the speaker “violent.” The BPAQ [10], 
on which our scale is based, is a measure of trait 
aggression and considers aggression as a personality 
trait assumed to be correlated with acts of aggression. 
Our results indicate that violent traits in content are not 
readily analogous to violent traits in people. We used 
this approach in order to avoid labeling individual users 
as “violent,” but it was challenging for coders to detect 
violence in the absence of information about the users 
and their other behaviors and opinions.  
Prior research on cyberbullying has also taken a 
user approach, labeling users as bullies and even using 
content from multiple platforms to build user models 
[15,16]. Labeling users also risks a “whack-a-mole” 
2 https://support.twitter.com/articles/20171399 
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problem in which individual accounts are abandoned as 
soon as they are labeled “bullies,” and the offending 
user just opens new accounts to continue the behaviors. 
Labeling content has the potential to enable us to build 
tools that let users set individualized thresholds for 
particular types of tweets without encouraging 
throwaway account creation. 
 
5.2. Translating existing measures of 
computer-mediated communication 
 
A number of items on existing harassment 
measures were poor fits for user-generated content. 
This finding bodes poorly for the method of adapting 
existing measures of aggression, cyber-aggression, and 
cyberbullying for Twitter. Rather than using items from 
existing scales, it may be beneficial to create items 
based on the types of harassment actually observed in 
the data. 
For example, item #10 (attacking credibility in 
order to undermine) was created based on our 
observations of the data and was a better fit than many 
of the items adapted from other measures. In contrast, 
the distinction between items 1 and 2 did not translate 
from offline to Twitter. We suggest that future attempts 
at measuring verbal violence on Twitter take a “bottom 
up” or grounded approach in which coders first identify 
the kinds of harassment occurring and then build a 
model. Further, validity is always a concern when using 
or developing measures of personality [26]. Avoiding 
adapting personality measures in favor of a grounded 
approach reduces the possibility of having a highly 
reliable but invalid measure. 
 
6. Conclusion and future work 
 
We have discussed how rarity, context, audience, 
and individual differences create challenges for 
detecting verbal violence in individual tweets. We have 
also identified differences in how on- and offline 
harassment unfold, thus limiting the utility of adapting 
existing harassment measures for online contexts. We 
are still committed to combatting harassment, though, 
and think that identifying when and how it occurs 
remain important first steps in that battle. We now turn 
to promising avenues for future research. 
First, we could return to the “individual users” 
approach to detecting harassment. By rating tweets 
from a single user we could determine whether the user 
is aggressive by using existing measures. These results 
could be cross-validated with the BPAQ by rating a 
user’s tweets, and then having the same user complete 
the BPAQ. This approach would at least measure 
whether a user’s content matches their personality. One 
study shows that at least one “real-life” personality trait 
often thought to be associated with aggression, 
narcissism (see [3,9,30,35]), persists in online 
environments; this is reflected in how people scoring 
high in narcissism conduct themselves on Facebook [8]. 
Even among the authors of this paper, however, there is 
disagreement about the utility of this approach given 
that people may behave differently in different online 
communities where norms of behavior are different 
[6,7].  
Situational differences are a challenge for all 
psychological measures, though, and second, we 
suggest future work consider the social situation in 
which users operate. For instance, we could use tweets’ 
context such as the volume and velocity of tweets, the 
number of accounts involved in a discussion, and the 
number of similar tweets sent to multiple people 
simultaneously to detect harassment. Each of these 
represents a way in which harassment online manifests 
differently from harassment offline. Online harassment, 
especially under the #GamerGate tag, often involves 
many people targeting a single individual instead of one 
person harassing one other person (i.e., dogpiling) and 
floods of tweets [48]. 
Lastly, we could examine various groups or 
conversations of tweets instead of focusing on 
individual utterances. A coding scheme like the 
Perpetrator-Act-Target (PAT) scheme [47], first 
developed for detecting violence on television, could 
potentially be applied to conversations. The PAT 
coding scheme takes a holistic approach to coding for 
violence, measuring violence at three separate levels: 
(1) the individual act (with a focus on the perpetrator, 
act, and target), (2) the scene in which an act(s) occurs, 
and (3) the complete program that the various scenes 
comprise. To apply a similar hierarchal scheme here, 
coders could simultaneously label the individual tweet 
within a conversation and the conversation as a whole. 
This would give us a two levels of detection – the 
individual tweet level and the conversation/thread level 
– while still avoiding labeling individual 
users/accounts. 
These areas of future work represent different 
approaches to improving our harassment response 
tools. The first improves on the user-labeling tools, 
potentially leading to new automated blocking or 
muting functions. The second leverages the unique 
features of online harassment to afford system-level 
tools that detect a situation in which harassment is 
likely to occur. The third considers the conversational 
context of the tweet to both improve coding and add a 
level of analysis. Approaches that combine information 
about users, situations, and conversations will likely be 
more effective. A combination of these approaches in 
which we attend to both users and their situation will 
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likely be most useful and emphasizes both the technical 
and social aspects of the response to harassment. 
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Table 1. Our scale items and between-coder agreement for each item 
# Item Agreement* 
1 User threatens physical violence as a means of protecting the user's rights. 94% 
2 User threatens other people or groups of people with physical harm and/or sexual violence. 94% 
3 User openly expresses disagreement. 56% 
4 User shares personal opinions of people, groups, or institutions that the user disfavors. 56% 
5 
User engages in or attempts to start arguments with people, groups, or social movements 
that the user disagrees with. 
63% 
6 User tweets potentially reputation damaging rumors about something else 94% 
7 User tweets non-physical threats or threatening reactions to or about someone. 94% 
8 User shares potentially embarrassing photos or videos of someone else. 88% 
9 User shares someone else's personally identifiable information. 94% 
10 
User attacks the credibility of another person or group of people in an attempt to invalidate 
the other party's stance or argument. 
63% 
11 User writes retaliatory comments in response to another person or group's words or actions 69% 
12 User expresses feelings that user or a group that user belongs to is being treated unfairly 44% 
13 
User expresses feelings of being misrepresented and/or under-represented by other people, 
groups of people, the media, etcetera. 
44% 
14 
User defends user's self or user's image, or the image of a group that the user belongs to or 
associates with. 
31% 
* Agreement percentages are indicative of the overall level of between-coder agreement on all 14 ratings across 20 
tweets. Kappa statistics are not provided, as they do not provide useful information given the low number of coders 
per tweet. 
 
Table 2. Information about our human coders 
Coder ID Age Gender Tweets Coded (N) 
1 24 Man 274 
2 23 Woman 306 
3 37 Man 123 
4 32 Woman 13 
5* 27 Man 183 
6 36 Man 1 
* Coder 5 reported multiple ages and genders but most frequently identified as a 27-year-old man 
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